Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective (MIT Press)

Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective (MIT Press)

Dan Zahavi


What is a self? Does it exist in truth or is it a trifling social build -- or is it probably a neurologically caused phantasm? The legitimacy of the concept that of the self has been wondered by way of either neuroscientists and philosophers in recent times. Countering this, in Subjectivity and Selfhood, Dan Zahavi argues that the inspiration of self is essential for a formal realizing of recognition. He investigates the interrelationships of expertise, self-awareness, and selfhood, offering that none of those 3 notions will be understood in isolation. Any research of the self, Zahavi argues, needs to take the first-person viewpoint heavily and concentrate on the experiential givenness of the self. Subjectivity and Selfhood explores a couple of phenomenological analyses bearing on the character of cognizance, self, and self-experience in mild of up to date discussions in attention research.

Philosophical phenomenology -- as built via Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others -- not just addresses the most important concerns usually absent from present debates over cognizance but in addition presents a conceptual framework for figuring out subjectivity. Zahavi fills the necessity -- given the hot upsurge in theoretical and empirical curiosity in subjectivity -- for an account of the subjective or exceptional measurement of recognition that's obtainable to researchers and scholars from various disciplines. His goal is to exploit phenomenological analyses to elucidate problems with primary value to philosophy of brain, cognitive technology, developmental psychology, and psychiatry. via conducting a discussion with different philosophical and empirical positions, says Zahavi, phenomenology can show its energy and modern relevance.

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