Empiricism and the Problem of Metaphysics

Empiricism and the Problem of Metaphysics

Paul Studtmann


If there's one totally inescapable challenge for the metaphysician, it's this: is metaphysics itself a theoretically valid self-discipline? Is it, in different phrases, able to a scientific and well-confirmed set of theoretical effects? And if now not, why now not? From its inception, metaphysics has chanced on itself exercised by way of the nagging fear that its personal inquiries could demonstrate it to be a subject matter with out an item, or a method of inquiry with out a approach. Such issues have been voiced as early as Plato's dialogue of the conflict among the Gods and Giants. on account that then, no period of its background has spared metaphysics a few practice session of this query.

In Empiricism and the matter of Metaphysics, Paul Studtmann defends an empiricist critique of metaphysical theorizing. on the middle of the critique is an empiricist view of a priori wisdom, in line with which all a priori wisdom is empirical wisdom of the result of potent approaches. this type of view of a priori wisdom areas critical limits at the scope a priori hypothesis and certainly areas past our ken the categories of claims that metaphysicians in addition to conventional epistemologists and ethicists have more often than not desired to make.

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